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The discussion of the foundations of quantum mechanics is complicated by the fact
that a number of different issues are closely entangled. Three of these issues are
i) the interpretation of probability, ii) the choice between realist and empiricist
interpretations of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, iii) the dis-
tinction between measurement and preparation. It will be demonstrated that an
interpretation of violation of Bell’s inequality by quantum mechanics as evidence
of non-locality of the quantum world is a consequence of a particular choice be-
tween these alternatives. Also a distinction must be drawn between two forms of
realism, viz. a) realist interpretations of quantum mechanics, b) the possibility of
hidden-variables (sub-quantum) theories.
1 Realist and empiricist interpretations of quantum mechanics
In realist interpretations of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics
state vector and observable are thought to refer to the microscopic object in
the usual way presented in most textbooks. Although, of course, preparing
and measuring instruments are often present, these are not taken into account
in the mathematical description (unless, as in the theory of measurement, the
subject is the interaction between object and measuring instrument).
In an empiricist interpretation quantum mechanics is thought to describe
relations between input and output of a measurement process. A state vector is
just a label of a preparation procedure; an observable is a label of a measuring
instrument. In an empiricist interpretation quantum mechanics is not thought
to describe the microscopic object. This, of course, does not imply that this
object would not exist; it only means that it is not described by quantum
mechanics. Explanation of relations between input and output of a measure-
ment process should be provided by another theory, e.g. a hidden-variables
(sub-quantum) theory. This is analogous to the way the theory of rigid bodies
describes the empirical behavior of a billiard ball, or to the description by ther-
modynamics of the thermodynamic properties of a volume of gas, explanations
being relegated to theories describing the microscopic (atomic) properties of
the systems.
Although a term like ‘observable’ (rather than ‘physical quantity’) is ev-
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Figure 1: EPR experiment.
idence of the empiricist origin of quantum mechanics (compare Heisenberg1),
there has always existed a strong tendency toward a realist interpretation in
which observables are considered as properties of the microscopic object, more
or less analogous to classical ones. Likewise, many physicists use to think about
electrons as wave packets flying around in space, without bothering too much
about the “Unanschaulichkeit” that for Schro¨dinger2 was such a problematic
feature of quantum theory. Without entering into a detailed discussion of the
relative merits of either of these interpretations (e.g. de Muynck3) it is noted
here that an empiricist interpretation is in agreement with the operational way
theory and experiment are compared in the laboratory. Moreover, it is free of
paradoxes, which have their origin in a realist interpretation. As will be seen in
the next section, the difference between realist and empiricist interpretations
is highly relevant when dealing with the EPR problem.
2 EPR experiments and Bell experiments
In figure 1 the experiment is depicted, proposed by Einstein, Podolsky and
Rosen4 to study (in)completeness of quantum mechanics. A pair of particles
(1 and 2) is prepared in an entangled state and allowed to separate. A mea-
surement is performed on particle 1. It is essential to the EPR reasoning that
particle 2 does not interact with any measuring instrument, thus allowing to
consider so-called ‘elements of physical reality’ of this particle, that can be con-
sidered as objective properties, being attributable to particle 2 independently
of what happens to particle 1. By EPR this arrangement was presented as a
way to perform a measurement on particle 2 without in any way disturbing this
particle.
The EPR experiment should be compared to correlation measurements
of the type performed by Aspect et al.5,6 to test Bell’s inequality (cf. figure
2). In these latter experiments also particle 2 is interacting with a measur-
ing instrument. In the literature these experiments are often referred to as
EPR experiments, too, thus neglecting the fundamental difference between
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Figure 2: Bell experiment.
the two measurement arrangements of figures 1 and 2. This negligence has
been responsible for quite a bit of confusion, and should preferably be avoided
by referring to the latter experiments as Bell experiments rather than EPR
ones. In EPR experiments particle 2 is not subject to a measurement, but to a
(conditional) preparation (conditional on the measurement result obtained for
particle 1). This is especially clear in an empiricist interpretation, because here
measurement results cannot exist unless a measuring instrument is present, its
pointer positions corresponding to the measurement results.
Unfortunately, the EPR experiment of figure 1 was presented by EPR as
a measurement performed on particle 2, and accepted by Bohr as such. That
this could happen is a consequence of the fact that both Einstein and Bohr
entertained a realist interpretation of quantum mechanical observables (note
that they differed with respect to the interpretation of the state vector), the
only difference being that Einstein’s realist interpretation was an objectivistic
one (in which observables are considered as properties of the object, possessed
independently of any measurement: the EPR ‘elements of physical reality’),
whereas Bohr’s was a contextualistic realism (in which observables are only
well-defined within the context of the measurement). Note that in Bell exper-
iments the EPR reasoning would break down because, due to the interaction
of particle 2 with its measuring instrument, there cannot exist ‘elements of
physical reality’.
Much confusion could have been avoided if Bohr had maintained his inter-
actional view of measurement. However, by accepting the EPR experiment as
a measurement of particle 2 he had to weaken his interpretation to a relational
one (e.g. Popper7, Jammer8), allowing the observable of particle 2 to be co-
determined by the measurement context for particle 1. This introduced for the
first time non-locality in the interpretation of quantum mechanics. But this
could easily have been avoided if Bohr had required that for a measurement
of particle 2 a measuring instrument should be actually interacting with this
very particle, with the result that an observable of particle n (n = 1, 2) can
be co-determined in a local way by the measurement context of that particle
only. This, incidentally, would have completely made obsolete the EPR ‘ele-
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ments of physical reality’, and would have been quite a bit less confusing than
the answer Bohr9 actually gave (to the effect that the definition of the EPR
‘element of physical reality’ would be ambiguous because of the fact that it did
not take into account the measurement arrangement for the other particle),
thus promoting the non-locality idea.
Summarizing, the idea of EPR non-locality is a consequence of i) a neglect
of the difference between EPR and Bell experiments (equating ‘elements of
physical reality’ to measurement results), ii) a realist interpretation of quantum
mechanics (considering measurement results as properties of the microscopic
object, i.c. particle 2). In an empiricist interpretation there is no reason to
assume any non-locality.
It is often asserted that non-locality is proven by the Aspect experiments,
because these are violating Bell’s inequality. The reason for such an assertion
is that it is thought that non-locality is a necessary condition for a derivation of
Bell’s inequality. However, as will be demonstrated in the following, this cannot
be correct since this inequality can be derived from quite different assumptions.
Also, experiments like the Aspect ones, -although violating Bell’s inequality,-
do not exhibit any trace of non-locality, because their measurement results
are completely consistent with the postulate of local commutativity, imply-
ing that relative frequencies of measurement results are independent of which
measurements are performed in causally disconnected regions. Admittedly,
this does not logically exclude a certain non-locality at the individual level,
being unobservable at the statistical level of quantum mechanical probability
distributions. However, from a physical point of view a peaceful coexistence
between locality at the (physically relevant) statistical level and non-locality
at the individual level is extremely implausible. Unobservability of the latter
would require a kind of conspiracy not unlike the one making unobservable
19th century world aether. For this reason the ‘non-locality’ explanation of the
experimental violation of Bell’s inequality does not seem to be very plausible,
and does it seem wise to look for alternative explanations.
Since non-locality is never the only assumption in deriving Bell’s inequal-
ity, such alternative explanations do exist. Thus, Einstein’s assumption of the
existence of ‘elements of physical reality’ is such an additional assumption.
More generally, in Bell’s derivation10 the existence of hidden-variables is one.
Is it still possible to derive Bell’s inequality if these assumptions are abol-
ished? Moreover, even assuming the possibility of hidden-variables theories,
are there in Bell’s derivation no hidden assumptions, additional to the locality
assumption.
Bell’s inequality refers to a set of four quantum mechanical observables,
A1, B1, A2 and B2, observables with different/identical indices being compati-
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ble/incompatible. In the Aspect experiments measurements of the four possible
compatible pairs are performed; in these experiments An and Bn refer to polar-
ization observables of photon n, n = 1, 2, respectively). Bell’s inequality can
typically be derived for the stochastic quantities of a classical Kolmogorovian
probability theory. Hence, violation of Bell’s inequality is an indication that
observables A1, B1, A2 and B2 are not stochastic quantities in the sense of Kol-
mogorov’s probability theory. In particular, there cannot exist a quadrivariate
joint probability distribution of these four observables. Such a non-existence
is a consequence of the incompatibility of certain of the observables. Since in-
compatibility is a local affair, this is another reason to doubt the ‘non-locality’
explanation of the violation of Bell’s inequality.
In the following derivations of Bell’s inequality will be scrutinized to see
whether the non-locality assumption is as crucial as was assumed by Bell. In
doing so it is necessary to distinguish derivations in quantum mechanics from
derivations in hidden-variables theories.
3 Bell’s inequality in quantum mechanics
For dichotomic observables, having values ±1, Bell’s inequality is given accord-
ing to
|〈A1A2〉 − 〈A1B2〉| − 〈B1B2〉 − 〈B1A2〉 ≤ 2. (1)
A more general inequality, being valid for arbitrary values of the observables,
is the BCHS inequality
− 1 ≤ p(b1, a2) + p(b1, b2) + p(a1, b2)− p(a1, a2)− p(b1)− p(b2) ≤ 0 (2)
from which (1) can be derived for the dichotomic case. Because of its indepen-
dence of the values of the observables inequality (2) is preferable by far over
inequality (1). Bell’s inequality may be violated if some of the observables are
incompatible: [A1, B1]− 6= O, [A2, B2]− 6= O.
I shall now discuss two derivations of Bell’s inequality, which can be formu-
lated within the quantum mechanical formalism, and which do not rely on the
existence of hidden variables. The first one is relying on a ‘possessed values’
principle, stating that

‘possessed
values’
principle
=


values of quantum mechanical observables
may be attributed to the object as
objective properties, possessed by the object
independent of observation
The ‘possessed values’ principle can be seen as an expression of the objectiv-
istic-realist interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism preferred by
Einstein (compare the EPR ‘elements of physical reality’). The important
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point is that by this principle well-defined values are simultaneously attributed
to incompatible observables. If a
(n)
i , b
(n)
j = ±1 are the values of Ai and Bj for
the nth of a sequence of N particle pairs, then we have
−2 ≤ a(n)1 a
(n)
2 − a
(n)
1 b
(n)
2 − b
(n)
1 b
(n)
2 − b
(n)
1 a
(n)
2 ≤ 2,
from which it directly follows that the quantities
〈A1A2〉 =
1
N
N∑
n=1
a
(n)
1 a
(n)
2 , etc.
must satisfy Bell’s inequality (1) (a similar derivation has first been given by
Stapp11, although starting from quite a different interpretation). The essential
point in the derivation is the assumption of the existence of a quadruple of
values (a1, b1, a2, b2) for each of the particle pairs.
From the experimental violation of Bell’s inequality it follows that an
objectivistic-realist interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism, en-
compassing the ‘possessed values’ principle, is impossible. Violation of Bell’s
inequality entails failure of the ‘possessed values’ principle (no quadruples avail-
able). In view of the important role measurement is playing in the interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics this is hardly surprising. As is well-known, due
to the incompatibility of some of the observables the existence of a quadruple
of values can only be attained on the basis of doubtful counterfactual rea-
soning. If a realist interpretation is feasible at all, it seems to have to be a
contextualistic one, in which the values of observables are co-determined by
the measurement arrangement. In the case of Bell experiments non-locality
does not seem to be involved.
As a second possibility to derive Bell’s inequality within quantum me-
chanics we should consider derivations of the BCHS inequality (2) from the
existence of a quadrivariate probability distribution p(a1, b1, a2, b2) by Fine
12
and Rastall13 (also de Muynck14). Hence, from violation of Bell’s inequality
the non-existence of a quadrivariate joint probability distribution follows. In
view of the fact that incompatible observables are involved, this, once again,
is hardly surprising.
A priori there are two possible reasons for the non-existence of the quadri-
variate joint probability distribution p(a1, b1, a2, b2). First, it is possible that
limN→∞N(a1, b1, a2, b2)/N of the relative frequencies of quadruples of mea-
surement results does not exist. Since, however, Bell’s inequality already fol-
lows from the existence of relative frequency N(a1, b1, a2, b2)/N with finite
N , and the limit N → ∞ is never involved in any experimental implementa-
tion, this answer does not seem to be sufficient. Therefore the reason for the
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Figure 3: Generalized Aspect experiment.
non-existence of the quadrivariate joint probability distribution p(a1, b1, a2, b2)
can only be the non-existence of relative frequencies N(a1, b1, a2, b2)/N . This
seems to reduce the present case to the previous one: Bell’s inequality can be
violated because quadruples (A1 = a1, B1 = b1, A2 = a2, B2 = b2) do not exist.
Could non-locality explain the non-existence of quadruples (A1 = a1, B1 =
b1, A2 = a2, B2 = b2)? Indeed, it could. If the value of A1, say, is co-determined
by the measurement arrangement of particle 2, then non-locality could entail
a1(A2) 6= a1(B2), (3)
thus preventing the existence of one single value of observable A1 for the two
Aspect experiments involving this observable. This, precisely, is the ‘non-
locality’ explanation referred to above. This explanation is close to Bohr’s
‘ambiguity’ answer to EPR, referred to in section 2, stating that the defini-
tion of an ‘element of physical reality’ of observable A1 must depend on the
measurement context of particle 2.
As will be demonstrated next, there is a more plausible local explanation,
however, based on the inequality
a1(A1) 6= a1(B1), (4)
expressing that the value of A1, say, will depend on whether either A1 or B1 is
measured. Inequality (4) could be seen as an implementation of Heisenberg’s
disturbance theory of measurement, to the effect that observables, incompati-
ble with the actually measured one, are disturbed by the measurement. That
such an effect is really occurring in the Aspect experiments, can be seen from
the generalized Aspect experiment depicted in figure 3. This experiment should
be compared with the Aspect switching experiment6, in which the switches have
been replaced by two semi-transparent mirrors (transmissivities γ1 and γ2, re-
spectively). The four Aspect experiments are special cases of the generalized
one, having γn = 0 or 1, n = 1, 2.
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Restricting for a moment to one side of the interferometer, it is possible
to calculate the joint detection probabilities of the two detectors according to
(pγ1(a1i, b1j)) =
(
0 γ1〈E(1)+〉
(1− γ1)〈F (1)+〉 1− γ1〈E(1)+〉 − (1− γ1)〈F (1)+〉
)
,
(5)
in which {E(1)+, E(1)−} and {F (1)+, F (1)−} are the spectral representations of
the two polarization observables (A1 and B1) in directions θ1 and θ
′
1, respec-
tively. The values a1i = +/−, b1j = +/− correspond to yes/no registration
of a photon by the detector. pγ1(+,+) = 0 means that, like in the switching
experiment, only one of the detectors can register photon 1. There, however, is
a fundamental difference with the switching experiment, because in this latter
experiment the photon wave packet is sent either toward one detector or the
other, whereas in the present one it is split so as to interact coherently with
both detectors. This makes it possible to interpret the right hand part of the
generalized experiment of figure 3 as a joint non-ideal measurement of the in-
compatible polarization observables in directions θ1 and θ
′
1 (e.g. de Muynck et
al.15), the joint probability distribution of the observables being given by (5).
It is not possible to extensively discuss here the relevance of experiments
of the generalized type for understanding Heisenberg’s disturbance theory of
measurement, and its relation to the Heisenberg uncertainty relations (see e.g.
de Muynck16). The important point is that such experiments do not fit into
the standard (Dirac-von Neumann) formalism in which a probability is an
expectation value of a projection operator. Indeed, from (5) it follows that
pγ1(a1i, b1j) = TrρR
(1)
ij is yielding operators R
(1)
ij according to
(R(1)ij) =
(
O γ1E
(1)
+
(1 − γ1)F (1)+ γ1E(1)− + (1 − γ1)F (1)−
)
. (6)
The set of operators {R(1)ij} constitutes a so-called positive operator-valued
measure (POVM). Only generalized measurements corresponding to POVMs
are able to describe joint non-ideal measurements of incompatible observables.
By calculating the marginals of probability distribution pγ1(a1i, b1j) it is possi-
ble to see that for each value of γ1 information is obtained on both polarization
observables, be it that information on polarization in direction θ1 gets more
non-ideal as γ1 decreases, while information on polarization in direction θ
′
1 is
getting more ideal. This is in perfect agreement with the idea of mutual dis-
turbance in a joint measurement of incompatible observables. The explanation
of the non-existence of a single measurement result for observable A1, say, as
implied by inequality (4), is corroborated by this analysis.
The analysis can easily be extended to the joint detection probabilities of
the whole experiment of figure 3. The joint detection probability distribution
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of all four detectors is given by the expectation value of a quadrivariate POVM
{Rijkℓ} according to
pγ1γ2(a1i, b1j, a2k, b2ℓ) = TrρRijkℓ. (7)
This POVM can be expressed in terms of the POVMs of the left and right
interferometer arms according to
Rijkℓ = R
(1)
ij R
(2)
kℓ . (8)
It is important to note that the existence of the quadrivariate joint prob-
ability distribution (7), and the consequent satisfaction of Bell’s inequality, is
a consequence of the existence of quadruples of measurement results, available
because it is possible to determine for each individual particle pair what is the
result of each of the four detectors. Although, because of (8), also locality
is assumed, this does not play an essential role. Under the condition that a
quadruple of measurement results exists for each individual photon pair Bell’s
inequality would be satisfied also if, due to non-local interaction, Rijkℓ were
not a product of operators of the two arms of the interferometer. The reason
why the standard Aspect experiments do not satisfy Bell’s inequality is the
non-existence of a quadrivariate joint probability distribution yielding the bi-
variate probabilities of these experiments as marginals. Such a non-existence
is strongly suggested by Heisenberg’s idea of mutual disturbance in a joint
measurement of incompatible observables. This is corroborated by the easily
verifiable fact that the quadrivariate joint probability distributions of the stan-
dard Aspect experiments, obtained from (7) and (8) by taking γn to be either
1 or 0, are all distinct. Moreover, in general the quadrivariate joint probability
distribution (7) for one standard Aspect experiment does not yield the bivari-
ate ones of the other experiments as marginals. Although it is not strictly
excluded that a quadrivariate joint probability distribution might exist having
the bivariate probabilities of the standard Aspect experiments as marginals
(hence, different from the ones referred to above), does the mathematical for-
malism of quantum mechanics not give any reason to surmise its existence. As
far as quantum mechanics is concerned, the standard Aspect experiments need
not satisfy Bell’s inequality.
4 Bell’s inequality in stochastic and deterministic hidden-variables
theories
In stochastic hidden-variables theories quantum mechanical probabilities are
usually given as
p(a1) =
∫
Λ
dλ ρ(λ)p(a1|λ), (9)
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in which Λ is the space of hidden variable λ (to be compared with classical
phase space), and p(a1|λ) is the conditional probability of measurement result
A = a1 if the value of the hidden variable was λ, and ρ(λ) the probability of λ.
It should be noticed that expression (9) fits perfectly into an empiricist inter-
pretation of the quantum mechanical formalism, in which measurement result
a1 is referring to a pointer position of a measuring instrument, the object being
described by the hidden variable. Since p(a1|λ) may depend on the specific way
the measurement is carried out, the stochastic hidden-variables model corre-
sponds to a contextualistic interpretation of quantum mechanical observables.
Deterministic hidden-variables theories are just special cases in which p(a1|λ)
is either 1 or 0. In the deterministic case it is possible to associate in a unique
way (although possibly dependent on the measurement procedure) the value
a1 to the phase space point λ the object is prepared in. A disadvantage of a
deterministic theory is that the physical interaction of object and measuring
instrument is left out of consideration, thus suggesting measurement result a1
to be a (possibly contextually determined) property of the object. In order to
have maximal generality it is preferable to deal with the stochastic case.
For Bell experiments we have
p(a1, a2) =
∫
Λ
dλ ρ(λ)p(a1, a2|λ), (10)
a condition of conditional statistical independence,
p(a1, a2|λ) = p(a1|λ)p(a2|λ), (11)
expressing that the measurement procedures of A1 and A2 do not influence
each other (so-called locality condition).
As is well-known the locality condition was thought by Bell to be the
crucial condition allowing a derivation of his inequality. This does not seem to
be correct, however. As a matter of fact, Bell’s inequality can be derived if a
quadrivariate joint probability distribution exists12,13. In a stochastic hidden-
variables theory such a distribution could be represented by
p(a1, b1, a2, b2) =
∫
Λ
dλ ρ(λ)p(a1, b1, a2, b2|λ), (12)
without any necessity that the conditional probability be factorizable in order
that Bell’s inequality be satisfied (although for the generalized experiment dis-
cussed in section 3 it would be reasonable to require that p(a1, b1, a2, b2|λ) =
p(a1, b1|λ)p(a2, b2|λ)). Analogous to the quantum mechanical case, it is suffi-
cient that for each individual preparation (here parameterized by λ) a quadru-
ple of measurement results exists. If Heisenberg measurement disturbance is
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a physically realistic effect in the experiments at issue, it should be described
by the hidden-variables theory as well. Therefore the explanation of the non-
existence of such quadruples is the same as in quantum mechanics.
However, with respect to the possibility of deriving Bell’s inequality there
is an important difference between quantum mechanics and the stochastic
hidden-variables theories of the kind discussed here. Whereas quantum me-
chanics does not yield any indication as regards the existence of a quadrivariate
joint probability distribution returning the bivariate probabilities of the As-
pect experiments as marginals, local stochastic hidden-variables theory does.
Indeed, using the single-observable conditional probabilities assumed to exist
in the local theory (compare (11)), it is possible to construct a quadrivariate
joint probability distribution according to
p(a1, a2, b1, b2) =
∫
Λ
dλ ρ(λ)p(a1|λ)p(a2|λ)p(b1|λ)p(b2|λ), (13)
satisfying all requirements. It should be noted that (13) does not describe
the results of any joint measurement of the four observables that are involved.
Quadruples (a1, a2, b1, b2) are obtained here by combining measurement results
found in different experiments, assuming the same value of λ in all experi-
ments. For this reason the physical meaning of this probability distribution
is not clear. However, this does not seem to be important. The existence
of (13) as a purely mathematical constraint is sufficient to warrant that any
stochastic hidden-variables theory in which (10) and (11) are satisfied, must
require that the standard Aspect experiments obey Bell’s inequality. Admit-
tedly, there is a possibility that (13) might not be a valid mathematical entity
because it is based on multiplication of the probability distributions p(a|λ),
which might be distributions in the sense of Schwartz’ distribution theory.
However, the remark made with respect to the existence of probability dis-
tributions as infinite−N limits of relative frequencies is valid also here: the
reasoning does not depend on this limit, but is equally applicable to relative
frequencies in finite sequences.
The question is whether this reasoning is sufficient to conclude that no
local hidden-variables theory can reproduce quantum mechanics. Such a con-
clusion would only be justified if locality would be the only assumption in
deriving Bell’s inequality. If there would be any additional assumption in this
derivation, then violation of Bell’s inequality could possibly be blamed on the
invalidity of this additional assumption rather than locality. Evidently, one
such additional assumption is the existence of hidden variables. A belief in the
completeness of the quantum mechanical formalism would, indeed, be a suffi-
cient reason to reject this assumption, thus increasing pressure on the locality
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assumption. Since, however, an empiricist interpretation is hardly reconcil-
able with such a completeness belief, we have to take hidden-variables theories
seriously, and look for the possibility of additional assumptions within such
theories.
In expression (9) one such assumption is evident, viz. the existence of
the conditional probability p(a1|λ). The assumption of the applicability of
this quantity in a quantum mechanical measurement is far less innocuous than
appears at first sight. If quantum mechanical measurements really can be
modeled by equality (9), this implies that a quantum mechanical measurement
result is determined, either in a stochastic or in a deterministic sense, by
an instantaneous value λ of the hidden variable, prepared independently of
the measurement to be performed later. It is questionable whether this is a
realistic assumption, in particular, if hidden variables would have the character
of rapidly fluctuating stochastic variables. As a matter of fact, every individual
quantum mechanical measurement takes a certain amount of time, and it will
in general be virtually impossible to determine the precise instant to be taken
as the initial time of the measurement, as well as the precise value of the
stochastic variable at that moment. Hence, hidden-variables theories of the
kind considered here may be too specific.
Because of the assumption of a non-contextual preparation of the hid-
den variable, such theories were called quasi-objectivistic stochastic hidden-
variables theories in de Muynck and van Stekelenborg17 (dependence of the
conditional probabilities p(a1|λ) on the measurement procedure preventing
complete objectivity of the theory). In the past attention has mainly been
restricted to quasi-objectivistic hidden-variables theories. It is questionable,
however, whether the assumption of quasi-objectivity is a possible one for
hidden-variables theories purporting to reproduce quantum mechanical mea-
surement results. The existence of quadrivariate probability distribution (13)
only excludes quasi-objectivistic local hidden-variables theories (either stochas-
tic or deterministic) from the possibility of reproducing quantum mechanics.
As will be seen in the next section, it is far more reasonable to blame quasi-
objectivity than locality for this, thus leaving the possibility of local hidden-
variables theories that are not quasi-objectivistic.
5 Analogy between thermodynamics and quantum mechanics
The essential feature of expression (9) is the possibility to attribute, either in
a stochastic or in a deterministic way, measurement result a1 to an instanta-
neous value of hidden variable λ. The question is whether this is a reasonable
assumption within the domain of quantum mechanical measurement. Are the
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conditional probabilities p(a1|λ) experimentally relevant within this domain?
In order to give a tentative answer to this question, we shall exploit the analogy
between thermodynamics and quantum mechanics, considered already a long
time ago by many authors (e.g. de Broglie18, Bohm et al.19,20, Nelson21,22).
Quantum mechanics → Hidden variables theory
(A1, A2, B1, B2) λ
l l
Thermodynamics → Classical statistical mechanics
(p, T, S) {qi, pi}
In this analogy thermodynamics and quantum mechanics are considered as
phenomenological theories, to be reduced to more fundamental “microscopic”
theories. The reduction of thermodynamics to classical statistical mechanics
is thought to be analogous to a possible reduction of quantum mechanics to
stochastic hidden-variables theory. Due to certain restrictions imposed on
preparations and measurements within the domains of the phenomenological
theories, their domains of application are thought to be contained in, but
smaller than, the domains of the “microscopic” theories.
In order to assess the nature and the importance of such restrictions let us
first look at thermodynamics. As is well-known (e.g. Hollinger and Zenzen23)
thermodynamics is valid only under a condition of molecular chaos, assuring
the existence of local equilibriuma necessary for the ergodic hypothesis to be
satisfied. Thermodynamics only describes measurements of quantities (like
pressure, temperature, and entropy) being defined for such equilibrium states.
From an operational point of view this implies that measurements within the
domain of thermodynamics do not yield information on the object system,
valid for one particular instant of time, but it is time-averaged information, time
averaging being replaced, under the ergodic hypothesis, by ensemble averaging.
In the Gibbs theory this ensemble is represented by the canonical density
function Z−1e−H({qn,pn})/kT on phase space. This state is called a macrostate,
to be distinguished from the microstate {qn, pn}, representing the point in
phase space the classical object is in at a certain instant of time.
The restricted validity of thermodynamics is manifest in a two-fold way:
i) through the restriction of all possible density functions on phase space to
the canonical ones; ii) through the restriction of thermodynamical quantities
(observables) to functionals on the space of thermodynamic states. Physi-
cally this can be interpreted as a restriction of the domain of application of
thermodynamics to those measurement procedures probing only properties of
the macrostates. This implies that such measurements only yield information
that is averaged over times exceeding the relaxation time needed to reach a
aIn “equilibrium thermodynamics” equilibrium is assumed to be even global.
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state of (local) equilibrium. Thus, it is important to note that thermodynamic
quantities are quite different from the physical quantities of classical statistical
mechanics, the latter ones being represented by functions of the microstate
{qn, pn} and, hence, referring to a particular instant of timeb. Only if it were
possible to perform measurements faster than the relaxation time, would it
be necessary to consider such non-thermodynamic quantities. Such measure-
ments, then, are outside the domain of application of thermodynamics. Thus,
if we have a cubic container containing a volume of gas in a microstate initially
concentrated at its center, and if we could measure at a single instant of time
either the total kinetic energy or the force exerted on the boundary of the con-
tainer, then these results would not be equal to thermodynamic temperature
and pressurec, respectively, because this microstate is not an equilibrium state.
Only after the gas has reached equilibrium within the volume defined by the
container (equilibrium) thermodynamics becomes applicable.
Within the domain of application of thermodynamics the microstate of the
system may change appreciably without the macrostate being affected. Indeed,
a macrostate is equivalent to an (ergodic) trajectory {qn(t), pn(t)}ergodic. We
might exploit as follows the difference between micro- and macrostates for char-
acterizing objectivity of a physical theory. Whereas the microstate is thought
to yield an objective description of the (microscopic) object, the macrostate
just describes certain phenomena to be attributed to the object system only
while being observed under conditions valid within the domain of application
of the theory. In this sense classical mechanics is an objective theory, all
quantities being instantaneous properties of the microstate. Thermodynamic
quantities, only being attributable to the macrostate (i.e., to an ergodic tra-
jectory), can not be seen, however, as properties belonging to the object at
a certain instant of time. Of course, we might attribute the thermodynamic
quantity to the event in space-time represented by the trajectory, but it should
be realized that this event is not determined solely by the preparation of the
microstate, but is determined as well by the macroscopic arrangement serving
to define the macrostate.
In order to illustrate this, consider two identical cubic containers differing
only in their orientations (cf. figure 4). In principle, the same microstate may
be prepared in the two containers. Because of the different orientations, how-
ever, the macrostates, evolving from this microstate during the time the gas is
reaching equilibrium with the container, are different (for different orientations
bNote that a “definition” of an instantaneous temperature by means of the equality 3/2nkT =∑
i
p
2
i
/2mi does not make sense, as can easily be seen by applying this “definition” to an
ideal gas in a container freely falling in a gravitational field.
cThermodynamic pressure is defined for the canonical ensemble by p = kT∂/∂V logZ.
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Figure 4: Incompatible thermodynamic arrangements.
of the container we have H1 6= H2, and, hence, e−H1/kT /Z1 6= e−H2/kT /Z2,
sinceH = T+V , and V1 6= V2 because potential energy is infinite outside a con-
tainer). This implies that thermodynamic macrostates may be different even
though starting from the same microstate. Macrostates in thermodynamics
have a contextual meaning. It is important to note that, since the container is
part of the preparing apparatus, this contextuality is connected here to prepa-
ration rather than to measurement. Consequently, whereas classical quantities
f({qn, pn}) can be interpreted as objective properties, thermodynamic quan-
tities are non-objective, the non-objectivity being of a contextual nature.
Let us now suppose that quantum mechanics is related to hidden-variables
theory analogous to the way thermodynamics is related to classical mechan-
ics, the analogy maybe being even closer for non-equilibrium thermodynamics
(only local equilibrium being assumed) than for the thermodynamics of global
equilibrium processes. Support for this idea was found in de Muynck and
van Stekelenborg17, where it was demonstrated that in the Husimi representa-
tion of quantum mechanics by means of non-negative probability distribution
functions on phase space an analogous restriction to a “canonical” set of dis-
tributions obtains as in thermodynamics. In particular, it was demonstrated
that the dispersionfree states ρ(q, p) = δ(q − q0)δ(p − p0) are not “canonical”
in this sense. This implies that within the domain of quantum mechanics it
does not make sense to consider the preparation of the object in a “microstate”
with a well-defined value of the hidden variables (q, p).
In the analogy quantum mechanical observables like A1, A2, B1, B2 should
be compared to thermodynamic quantities like pressure, temperature, and en-
tropy. The central issue in the analogy is the fact that thermodynamic quanti-
ties like pressure and temperature cannot be conditioned on the instantaneous
phase space variable {qn, pn} (microstate). Expressions like p({qn, pn}) and
T ({qn, pn}) are meaningless within thermodynamics. Thermodynamic quan-
tities are conditioned on macrostates, corresponding to ergodic paths in phase
space. Analogously, a quantum mechanical observable might not correspond
to an instantaneous property of the object, but might have to be associated
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with an (ergodic) path in hidden-variables space Λ (macrostate) rather than
with an instantaneous value λ (microstate).
On the basis of the analogy between thermodynamics and quantum me-
chanics it is possible to state the following conjectures:
• Quantum mechanical measurements (analogous to thermodynamic mea-
surements) do not probe microstates but macrostates.
• Quantum mechanical quantities (analogous to thermodynamic quanti-
ties) should be conditioned on macrostates.
A hidden-variables macrostate will be symbolically indicated by λ
t
. For
quantum mechanical measurements the conditional probabilities p(a1|λ) of (9)
should then be replaced by p(a1|λ
t
). Concomitantly, quantum mechanical
probabilities should be represented in the hidden-variables theory by a func-
tional integral,
p(a1) =
∫
dλ
t
ρ(λ
t
)p(a1|λ
t
), (14)
in which the integration is over all possible macrostates consistent with the
preparation procedure.
By itself conditioning of quantum mechanical observables on macrostates
rather than microstates is not sufficient to prevent derivation of Bell’s inequal-
ity. As a matter of fact, on the basis of expression (14) a quadrivariate joint
probability distribution can be defined, analogous to (13), according to
p(a1, a2, b1, b2) =
∫
dλ
t
ρ(λ
t
)p(a1|λ
t
)p(a2|λ
t
)p(b1|λ
t
)p(b2|λ
t
), (15)
from which Bell’s inequality can be derived just as well. There is, however,
one important aspect that up till now has not sufficiently been taken into ac-
count, viz. contextuality. In the construction of (15) it is assumed that the
macrostate λ
t
is applicable in each of the measurement arrangements of ob-
servables A1, A2, B1, and B2. Because of the incompatibility of some of these
observables this is an implausible assumption. On the basis of the thermo-
dynamic analogy it is to be expected that macrostates λ
t
will depend on the
measurement context of a specific observable. Since [A1, B1]− 6= O, we will
have
λ
tA1
6= λ
tB1
, (16)
and analogously for A2 and B2. Then, for the Bell experiments measuring the
pairs (A1, A2) and (A1, B2), respectively, we have
p(a1, a2) =
∫
dλ
tA1A2
ρ(λ
tA1A2
)p(a1|λ
tA1A2
)p(a2|λ
tA1A2
), (17)
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p(a1, b2) =
∫
dλ
tA1B2
ρ(λ
tA1B2
)p(a1|λ
tA1B2
)p(a2|λ
tA1B2
). (18)
Now, the contextuality expressed by inequality (16) prevents the construction
of a quadrivariate joint probability distribution analogous to (15). Hence,
like in the quantum mechanical approach, also in the local non-objectivistic
hidden-variables theory a derivation of Bell’s inequality is prevented due to the
local contextuality involved in the interaction of the particle and the measuring
instrument it is directly interacting with.
6 Conclusions
Our conclusion is that if quantum mechanical measurements do probe macro-
states λ
tA
rather than microstates λ, then Bell’s inequality cannot be derived
for quantum mechanical measurements. Both in quantum mechanics and in
hidden-variables theories is Bell’s inequality a consequence of the assumption
that the theory is yielding an objective description of reality in the sense that
the preparation of the microscopic object, as far as relevant to the realization
of the measurement result, can be thought to be independent of the measure-
ment arrangement. The important point to be noticed is that, although in
Bell experiments the preparation of the particle pair at the source (i.e. the
microstate) can be considered to be independent of the measurement proce-
dures to be carried out later (and, hence, one and the same microstate can be
assumed in different Bell experiments), the measurement result is only deter-
mined by the macrostate, which is co-determined by the interaction with the
measuring instruments. It really seems that the Copenhagen maxim of the
impossibility of attributing quantum mechanical measurement results to the
object as objective properties, possessed independently of the measurement,
should be taken very seriously, and implemented also in hidden-variables the-
ories purporting to reproduce the quantum mechanical results. The quantum
mechanical dice is only cast after the object has been interacting with the mea-
suring instrument, even though its result can be deterministically determined
by the (sub-quantum mechanical) microstate.
The thermodynamic analogy suggests which experiments could be done
in order to transcend the boundaries of the domain of application of quan-
tum mechanics. If it would be possible to perform experiments that probe
the microstate λ rather than the macrostate λ
tA
, then we are in the domain
of (quasi-)objectivistic hidden-variables theories. Because of (13) it, then, is
to be expected that Bell’s inequality should be satisfied for such experiments.
In such experiments preparation and measurement must be completed well
within the relaxation time of the microstates. Such times have been estimated
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by Bohm24 “for the sake of illustration” as the time light needs to cover a dis-
tance of the order of the size of an atom (10−18 s, say). If this is correct, then
all present-day experimentation is well within the range of quantum mechan-
ics, thus explaining the seemingly universal applicability of this latter theory.
By hindsight, this would explain why Aspect’s switching experiment6 is cor-
roborating quantum mechanics: the applied switching frequency (50 MHz),
although sufficient to warrant locality, has been far too low to beat the local
relaxation processes in each of the measuring instruments separately.
It has often been felt that the most surprising feature of Bell experiments
is the possibility (in certain states) of a strict correlation between the measure-
ment results of the two measured observables, without being able to attribute
this to a previous preparation of the object (no ‘elements of physical reality ’).
For many physicists the existence of such strict correlations has been reason
enough to doubt Bohr’s Copenhagen solution to renounce causal explanation
of measurement results, and to replace ‘determinism’ by ‘complementarity’. It
seems that the urge for causal reasoning has been so strong that even within
the Copenhagen interpretation a certain causality has been accepted, even a
non-local one, in an EPR experiment (cf. figure 1) determining a measurement
result for particle 2 by the measurement of particle 1. This, however, should
rather be seen as an internal inconsistency of this interpretation, caused by
a tendency to make the Copenhagen interpretation as realist as possible. In
a consistent application of the Copenhagen interpretation to Bell experiments
such experiments could be interpreted as measurements of bivariate correlation
observables. The certainty of obtaining a certain (bivariate) eigenvalue of such
an observable would not be more surprising than the certainty of obtaining a
certain eigenvalue of a univariate one if the state vector is the corresponding
eigenvector.
It is important to note that this latter interpretation of Bell experiments
takes seriously the Copenhagen idea that quantum mechanics need not ex-
plain the specific measurement result found in an individual measurement.
Indeed, in order to compare theory and experiment it would be sufficient that
quantum mechanics just describe the relative frequencies found in such mea-
surements. In this view quantum mechanics is just a phenomenological theory,
in an analogous way describing (not explaining) observations as does thermo-
dynamics in its own domain of application. Explanations should be provided
by “more fundamental” theories, describing the mechanisms behind the ob-
servable phenomena. Hence, the Copenhagen ‘completeness’ thesis should be
rejected (although this need not imply a return to determinism).
This approach has important consequences. One consequence is that the
non-existence, within quantum mechanics, of ‘elements of physical reality’ does
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not imply that ‘elements of physical reality’ do not exist at all. They could
be elements of the “more fundamental” theories. In section 5 it was discussed
how an analogy between quantum mechanics and thermodynamics could be
exploited to spell this out. ‘Elements of physical reality’ could correspond
to hidden-variables microstates λ. The determinism necessary to explain the
strict correlations, referred to above, would be explained if, within a given
measurement context, a microstate would define a unique macrostate λ
tA
. This
demonstrates how it could be possible that quantum mechanical measurement
results cannot be attributed to the object as properties possessed prior to mea-
surement, and there, yet, is sufficient determinism to yield a local explanation
of strict correlations of quantum mechanical measurement results in certain
Bell experiments.
Another important aspect of a dissociation of phenomenological and fun-
damental aspects of measurement is the possibility of an empiricist interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics. As demonstrated by the generalized Aspect
experiment discussed in section 3, an empiricist approach needs a general-
ization of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, in which an
observable is represented by a POVM rather than by a projection-valued mea-
sure corresponding to a self-adjoint operator of the standard formalism. Such
a generalization has been very important in assessing the meaning of Bell’s
inequality. In the major part of the literature of the past this subject has been
dealt with on the basis of the (restricted) standard formalism. However, some
conclusions drawn from the restricted formalism are not cogent when viewed in
the generalized one (for instance, because von Neumann’s projection postulate
is not applicable in general). For this reason we must be very careful when
accepting conclusions drawn from the standard formalism. This, in particular,
holds true for the issue of non-locality.
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